ABSTRACT
As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2 , land law and the conveyancing system in England and Wales underwent radical reform with effect from 1 January 1926. However, it was as obvious then as it is now that the task of transforming a basically feudal system of law into one that could adequately serve the twentieth century and beyond could not be accomplished overnight. Thus, from the very fi rst, it was intended that registration of title and the accompanying provisions of what was then the Land Registration Act (LRA) 1925 would be phased in, rather like e-conveyancing is being phased in today under the LRA 2002. At fi rst, registered conveyancing was restricted geographically to the main urban areas and it was not until 1 December 1990 that all of England and Wales became subject to compulsory fi rst registration of title. This meant that much land remained within the old system of conveyancing, sometimes known as the system of ‘private unregistered conveyancing’, in order to distinguish it from the State-guaranteed system established by the Land Registration Acts. Although the amount of land that remains unregistered today is relatively small and getting smaller, 1 there is a residual need to understand the basic structure of unregistered land even though it is of diminishing importance. 2
However, even accepting the unavoidable residual role for unregistered land, it was clear a long time before 1925 that the system of ‘private unregistered conveyancing’ in its
original form was unwieldy, complicated and ineffi cient. 3 The pre-1926 law that could have operated pending the arrival of comprehensive registration of title offered neither certainty to a purchaser nor adequate protection for a person who enjoyed rights over that land. For example, the doctrine of notice, and especially the development of constructive notice, could mean that a purchaser was bound by a third-party equitable interest even if that interest seriously devalued the use and enjoyment of his (the purchaser’s) land, and in circumstances in which the purchaser ‘knew’ of the right only in the most vague or technical sense. Conversely, a person seeking to enforce an equitable right over someone else’s estate (e.g. an equitable easement) might fi nd their interest void against a purchaser through no fault of their own, and in circumstances in which they could have done little to protect it. Furthermore, the lengths to which a purchaser had to go to investigate the title of a proposed seller, and the potential number of persons with whom he had to agree a sale in cases of joint ownership, made unregistered conveyancing a burdensome and expensive task.
