ABSTRACT
During 1951-52, two projects for the defence of the Middle East were ventilated – the still-born Middle East Command (MEC) and its equally abortive successor, the Middle East Defense Organisation (MEDO). MEC and MEDO were to have served two equally important purposes. First, to finesse the Egyptians into a new base agreement with the Western Allies. This would have superseded the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1936, while leaving the British base installations essentially intact. And equally important for the British, the MEC might serve as a channel for an American military involvement in this theatre. British strategic planners also perceived clearly the virtues of uniting the Middle East under British military leadership into a united regional command to resist Soviet encroachment. In a joint statement issued after the conference, the Allies declared that it would be premature for them to pass judgement on the Egyptian proposal for an Arab collective security pact, and their position on that project would remain noncommittal.
