ABSTRACT

We focus here on the domestic components of Pursue and Prevent – the latter of which was under review by the coalition government at the time of writing – as the main coercive and communicative elements of the policy. The Pursue workstream aims to confront the threat posed by terrorism through counter-terrorism initiatives including intelligence and investigation (HM Government 2009: 63), while Prevent aims to stop terrorism from taking place by ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Muslim community (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007b: 1). Both these strands have faced intense criticism for practices that repress and discriminate against Muslims, and label them as ‘suspect’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2008; Fekete 2001; Liberty 2004; Kundnani 2009). Notable examples include exceptional legislative measures being created specifically to target Islamic terrorism, extended pre-charge detention periods, intrusive surveillance programmes, newer and broader terrorism offences, securitised community projects and policies that legitimate the use of deadly force such as ‘Operation Kratos’ that, in certain circumstances, authorises the use of a ‘head shot’ – otherwise known as a policy of ‘shoot-to-kill’ (Metropolitan Police Authority 2005a, 2005b). These measures, however, rather than successfully targeting terrorists have largely affected Muslims indiscriminately, meaning many innocent Muslims have been disproportionately affected. This is not an unpleasant by-product of mistakes, ignorance or arrogance, we argue: the laws and programmes that underpin these strategies have been created intentionally and purposefully to coerce and instil fear within the Muslim community and those who stand with it. This is because key components of the Pursue and Prevent strands are based on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, which involve both ‘coercion’ (in the sense of using physical or ‘kinetic’ power, i.e. violence), and ‘propaganda’ and

‘communication’ (in the sense of using psychological warfare against a perceived enemy). We use an investigative research approach to uncover the intellectual and practical antecedents of the policy and examine the way in which it has been put into practice. The chapter uncovers the hitherto little-known development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the UK, using documents released to the authors under the Freedom of Information Act; it examines how the doctrine utilises coercion and ‘propaganda’ and looks at the involvement of military officers in formulating key parts of the CONTEST strategy and their specific expertise in counterinsurgency and information operations (I-Ops). The practical implementation of the strategy is then examined by analysing the governmental bodies involved, namely the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and the Home Office-based Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and its key offshoot, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU). We also look at one of the key civil society bodies set up and funded by the OSCT – the ‘anti-extremist’ Quilliam Foundation. But, before turning to analyse the role of those bodies, we commence our analysis by looking at the three fundamental counterinsurgency measures that have become deeply entrenched within Pursue and Prevent – exceptional legislation, pre-emptive incapacitation measures and intelligence and surveillance structures.