ABSTRACT
Embodied cognitions should be a special class of cognitions. Cognitions are embodied when they reuse B-codes because B-codes have the function to represent bodily states. Embodied Cognition seems to be a field in need of unification. Efforts like Clark's to characterize Embodied Cognition straddle this line, doing little to justify why some instances of embodied cognition are cognitive at all. Embodied Cognition lacks the uniformity that other sciences boast. An experience of pain also counts, for Goldman, as an instance of an embodied cognition because the experience depends on activation of areas of the brain with the special function of representing disturbances within the body. Reflecting the range of topics within Embodied Cognition is a wide scattering of views on how, exactly, the body contributes to cognition. Processing, in these cases, appears to have a compelling claim on being embodied in keeping with Goldman's suggestion, although in neither case is there anything fitting the description of a dedicated B-code.
