ABSTRACT
This essay provides a critical examination of the economic approach to criminal participation embedded within the orthodox core of Chicago economics. Many of the key features of the economics of criminal participation are a reflection of its parent mainstream research tradition, including a narrow and mechanical model of homo economicus and rational choice largely removed from any societal context. Their shared assumptions of stable, fully-formed and independent preferences, along with ethical neutrality, results in the neglect of such factors as endogenous preferences, values and morality. Within such frameworks the notion of ‘economic man’ is seen as all encompassing with opportunistic rather than human action, detached from, and often disregarding of others. Such economic agents are presented as not only over-individualised but also under-socialised. This permits intersubjective distance to be established between agents and serves to reduce both the degree of potential connectedness and any gains from ‘regarding of others’ type co-operative strategies. In addition, the economics of criminal participation follows Chicago orthodoxy in neglecting the temporal and non-price dimensions of behaviour. Economic action is not only removed from (interpersonal) space but also (historical) time. This removes any threat of lock-in or costly errors from choosing which cannot be easily undone. Further, the Chicago focus upon price results in either the neglect of non-price entry barriers into crime or their incorporation under the guise of a price. Law establishes a set of prices (or penalties) which influence conduct; agents respond to these legal signals by engaging in crime when the net benefits from such activity outweigh those to be earned in the legal arena. We are
all seen to be equally susceptible to criminal participation if the price is right and crime is presented as normal and not unlike work. Explanatory attention is directed at the role of changing constraints rather than changing preferences, with the key elements of rational choice – the preference, utility maximisation, and constraint hypotheses – serving to reinforce the emphasis upon changing external situational constraints (rewards and punishments) and supporting the economist’s deterrence model of crime.
