How size of concessions may influence systemic corruption in forest harvesting: A theoretical assessment
Addressing this issue of corruption and forest harvesting requires us to define the type of corruption considered. An important distinction is between policy-maker and bureaucratic corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999; World Bank 2000; Wilson and Damania 2005). First, policy-maker or “grand” corruption consists of offering bribes to the policy-maker in order to influence his policy choices. Second, bureaucratic or “petty” corruption consists of paying bribes to civil agents to avoid the consequences of a particular rule. Of course, the two types of corruption are rarely observed separately. Corruption is generally a systemic phenomenon. A corrupt policy-maker often coexists with a corrupt bureaucracy, and modification vice versa. Moreover, both kinds of corruption may interact. A key objective of this chapter is thus to analyze how bureaucratic corruption may be linked to policy-maker corruption in the context of forest harvesting.