ABSTRACT
The previous chapters have been based upon the assumption that the best way to think about art is a normative one, that is to say, one concerned with its value. In the end, though, to be able to say that art has a special sort of value depends upon our being able to make substantial value judgements about particular works of art. Music is important if and only if we can show that, critically considered, those compositions and performances generally heralded as great, truly are great; a novel enriches us only if it truly is enriching; and so on. More especially, any one who holds a cognitivist account of the value of art such as the previous chapters have advanced and defended, will have to be able to show, of any given work, that objectively speaking it does indeed have the cognitive value attributed to it. In short, a normative approach to art and a cognitivist explanation of its value depend crucially on being able to distinguish between sound and unsound judgements about what is and is not aesthetically valuable.
