ABSTRACT
Whatever may have been in the minds of right-wing conspirators and left-wing militants during the ‘ominous spring’ of 1936, it was certainly not a prolonged civil war. The carefully worked-out plan of the military plotters was for as swift a takeover as possible; if, however, the ideal was a classic pronunciamiento along the lines of 1923, General Mola was not alone in appreciating that times had changed and that opposition would have to be overcome. The rebel officers’ paramilitary allies, the Carlists and Falangists, were certainly eager to spill the blood of their left-wing enemies, yet they too thought in terms of days rather than years of actual military conflict. What turned the rising of 17-18 July 1936 into a civil war was, first of all, the rebels’ failure, due to hesitation and division within the officer corps and the militarized police forces, to seize control quickly enough throughout the country; second, the decision of the Republican government to arm the UGT and CNT militias, which contributed to the defeat of the rising in important centres; and finally the intervention of foreign powers, enabling the two sides to continue the struggle indefinitely.
