ABSTRACT
In a practical sense, if we are trying to explain why the different patterns occurred and why they led to the identified outcomes, what is important is the relative strength of civil society forces and old regime forces at the opening of negotiations. The notion of strength in this context refers to the ability to achieve one’s ends, including the commitment on the part of elites to the achievement of those ends. In Patterns One and Three, civil society forces were clearly stronger than the regime and democracy resulted, while in Pattern Six the reverse situation applied, with authoritarian rule the outcome. In Pattern Two, although the civil society forces were not well formed at the time of regime crisis, the weakness of the regime (and most particularly the loss of the will to rule on the part of its leaders) ultimately rendered that regime much weaker than the oppositionist forces. In Pattern Four, nationalist forces took over the state before the collapse of the old regime. Where civil society forces based on civic considerations were able to enter the political scene, democracy resulted (Lithuania). Where nationalist forces continued to dominate and define the agenda, the result was façade democracy of either the ethnic (Estonia, Latvia and Moldova) or plebiscitarian (Georgia and Croatia) kind. Where such civil society forces were unable to enter the political arena in a major way, non-democracy resulted (Armenia). In Pattern Five the nature of the coalition between old regime and oppositionist forces depended on the strength of civil society forces and divisions within the state. In Slovenia civil society forces played an important structuring role, leading to a democratic outcome. In Russia, Ukraine and Macedonia they were much less important, leading to a façade democracy, while in authoritarian Kyrgyzstan they played no role. In Russia and Kyrgyzstan, the crucial thing given the weakness of civil society forces was the split within the state apparatus.
