ABSTRACT
Feinberg writes that ‘group liability is inevitably distributive: what harms the group as a whole necessarily harms its members.’ This judgment occurs in the context of a discussion of non-distributive group fault where Feinberg concedes that ‘one would think that where group fault is non-distributive, group liability must be so too, lest it fall vicariously on individual members who are faultless.’1 There seems to be a dilemma here: either we have to accept ascriptions of group liability even though they may result in harm to individuals who are not at fault, or else the whole point of talking about collective actions and group responsibility for these actions is lost. One way around this dilemma would be to try to make ascriptions of group liability more morally palatable, and I regard May’s The Morality of Groups as an important though flawed step in this direction.2 On May’s analysis, corporations may be blameworthy for certain wrongdoings, but only corporate officers should be punished for them. This is in accord with the widely held conviction that where there is wrongdoing we should try to pick out the individual wrongdoers, but it fails, I think, to do full justice to the idea of vicarious collective responsibility. Even in cases where there is no evidence of vicarious corporate negligence, a corporation may be vicariously responsible for wrongs done ‘in its name.’ Still, in its efforts to drive a wedge, as I see it, between ascriptions of liability and the distribution of actual punishment, May’s book represents an important pioneering effort, and I wish now to explore further some of the ways in which the seeming harshness of ascriptions of collective liability could be alleviated.
