ABSTRACT
The fIrst theme in my criticism is whether rights are necessary or useful in trying to achieve social equality. Drawing on feminist political theories, I suggest that formal legal equality will have litde impact on the current social construction of sexuality, which stigmatises non-heterosexuals. I argue that legal equality with heterosexuals will not produce social equality with heterosexuals, since their freedoms are founded on homosexual oppression; their rights are heterosexual rights, and gaining those will not transform non-heterosexuals into their equals. My second criticism is focused on the discourse of rights itsel£ I analyse the essentialism that underpins the individualistic conception of rights and argue that this may reinforce the essentialist understanding of sexuality, thus compounding the very problem we seek to overcome. In conclusion, I discuss the potential for common ground with feminist and normative theorists who have suggested alternatives to individualism, such as group-based rights (Young 1989) or rights that recognise differences in opportunity and ability (Kingdom 1991).
