ABSTRACT
The over-riding basis of public choice theory is of self interest or ‘utility maximisation’ in the economic jargon. There have been ample studies of the predictions and foundations of the various strands of public choice theory to enable us to conclude what might appear obvious, namely, that ‘Political man is not the selfish creature suggested by public choice’ (Udehn, 1996: 60). Tufte (1978) and Hee-Soh (1986) have highlighted the important role of ideology in economic policy making and downplayed the limited evidence for the existence of business cycles in national politics. But, while it is appealing to reinforce the generally cynical view of politicians as being ready to manipulate economies for their own benefit, this still does not necessarily imply self-interest, merely a desire to win elections. This can be for reasons other than self-interest, e.g., public interest. Similarly, the public choice view of bureaucrats as being concerned primarily with maximising budgets to benefit from increased salaries, reputation, power, patronage, etc., is also highly questionable. Dunleavy (1985) criticises this view on three grounds. First, the view of bureaucracies as homogenous is mistaken – they are varied in aims and constitution. Rather than assuming that bureaucrats in such heterogeneous circumstances are all concerned with maximising their own benefits through budget maximisation, there are other ways of achieving personal benefits – managers might, for example, be concerned with minimising budgets and costs in order to please political masters. Second, there are many ways for a bureaucrat to act in their own interest that do not involve budget maximisation. While self-interest may be a motive, this cannot be automatically assumed from any method employed by a bureaucrat. Finally, and related to the above point, bureaucrats can also be motivated by a conception of the common good.
