ABSTRACT
Any exploration of the postmodern usually commences with a vain attempt at answering the question ‘what is the postmodern?’ I shall be no different. Before I attempt to answer the question however, I would like to digress and set out how the postmodern itself precludes any simple answer to this. The postmodern is such a multifaceted phenomenon that it is difficult, if not misleading, to ascribe any specific meaning. In fact, to do so would not be postmodern at all. For, according to many authors, the postmodern at its most essential is a celebration of difference and a suspicion of foundation and truth. So even before I attempt a definition, I encounter a paradox. I want to convey some essence of what I feel the postmodern is, but in doing so I will inevitably be using the modernist tools of foundational thought; trying to pigeonhole something, to give it a ‘completeness’ and boundaries. This paradox emerges from the most-used definition: the postmodern is, in Lyotard’s (1984) phrase, ‘an incredulity towards meta-narratives’. In other words, a scepticism or suspicion towards theory or totality. Lyotard’s much-quoted phrase is the basis of many answers to the question, ‘what is the postmodern?’. But, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, this definition sounds like a meta-narrative itself. So, in the spirit of this, we should logically be suspicious of Lyotard’s meta-narrative and
consequently suspicious of the postmodern. Lyotard is not alone in falling into a trap of his own setting. Foucault announces the end of the role of the intellectual in speaking ‘truth to power’ as Rabinow puts it (1984: 23). Like Lyotard, this is based on Foucault’s desire to historicise and problematise accepted ‘truths’ and unmask the ‘will to power’ behind notions such as ‘liberty’ and ‘truth’. But how can Foucault make such sweeping pronouncements and on what basis is his knowledge superior in this regard? Derrida has taken Foucault to task for attempting to escape the rationality he seeks to critique. Any such attempt is doomed as he will inevitably become caught up in the very terms and structures we seek to escape. How can we communicate ‘unreason’ without using ‘reason’? This raises problem number one. Problem number two follows on from this and though on the face of it seems to address problem one, in fact only adds to it. The logic of suspicion towards meta-narratives is to emphasise instead plurality and difference. Indeed, without a hint of irony, Lyotard actually calls for a law of difference to ensure this. If this is so, then any definition of the postmodern will be as legitimate as the next as there is no overall theory or meta-narrative against which to assess it. If every definition is correct, then every definition must also be incorrect as there can never be any absolute. If we apply this to the field of ethics or politics then how can progress or action be undertaken? How can we ensure that difference is maintained? This is a problem that Lyotard realised and found the only way to overcome it was to fall back on modernist prescription: to ensure difference we have to force it. Similarly, Foucault (according to Baudrillard) found the logic of his critique of modernity too troubling as it pointed to a world of relativity and nihilism. This is, of course, judging the postmodern by modern standards and as Kumar (1995) points out, we should really judge it by its own standards. Whether we choose to do this or not says more about us than it does about postmodernism. For example, do you believe that there is no such thing as truth, i.e. an objective, black and white right and wrong? Most people would say ‘yes’. But truth is a slippery concept. If asked, ‘do you always tell the truth?’, I suspect most people would say ‘no’. There are times when we need to hide the truth though this does not mean that we are ‘bad’ or not committed to the truth as an ideal. The postmodern perspective relativises truth (there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’) and even goes as far as denying truth actually exists. So, for most people, it is anathema. But here’s the rub: the postmodern is so diverse that when applying standard critical tests such as ‘is this theory true?’ and coming to the conclusion that it is not, then another equally postmodern theory can be pointed at that either backs up, denies or alters the first theory so as to invalidate the question. Take Foucault’s view of power as a seamless web that flows and has no locus (outlined further on in this chapter). Does power operate in this way? Foucault says so, but Baudrillard says it ignores important cultural influences. Power is far more plural than Foucault has allowed for. The ‘truth’ in this case is twofold.
