ABSTRACT
When we think of the term ‘history’ we recognise it with an easy familiarity and are likely to be impressed rather than bewildered by the massive variety of subject-matter it encompasses. Its immense scope does not discourage us from nevertheless regarding it as a distinct, singular subject, and in this respect it is similar to ‘literature’ and ‘science’. Unlike subjects such as music and theology which seem intrinsically well-defined in scope, ‘history’, ‘literature’, and ‘science’ are still easily recognised as distinct subjects despite the diverse abundance of topics and approaches they respectively embrace. This is a statement of fact, of course, not a philosophical point-and yet we might take encouragement from a possible perception it offers; namely, that despite the huge difficulties philosophy encounters in trying to extract the ‘essence’ of history as a discipline from the vast field of historical studies, the common wisdom of language, at least, promises that such efforts can be rewarded.
