ABSTRACT
Differences in a number of policy perceptions between German and Anglo-Saxon economists make a consideration of the title of this chapter appropriate. It will be noticed that the general term ‘economic policy’ has been preferred. This is because it combines the notions of ‘industrial’ and ‘competition’ policies as they have evolved in Germany. ‘Economic policy’ likewise avoids the controversy which has been generated by the respective roles of industrial and competition policy (Neumann in Cowling and Tomann 1990:222; Sturm 1989b:155–60). More specifically, within the theoretical framework of the SME the term ‘industrial policy’ has negative connotations: ‘advocates of industrial policy deviate from the regulatory policy path of competition’ (Sauter in Cowling and Tomann 1990:234). Yet the regulatory policy path of competition—as seen in Chapter 1—really means in Anglo-Saxon, particularly US, parlance the presence of strong anti-trust legislation. As Berghahn has demonstrated (1986:32, 100 and 140), the major objective of such legislation in the USA was to preserve the principle of competition and to protect it against misuse. This approach permitted the US authorities to draw a sharp distinction between the decartelisation and deconcentration of German industry after the war. It will be shown below that German legislation designed to ‘regulate’ competition policy consists of precisely identical strands, namely controlling cartels and attempting to prevent the abuse of market-dominant positions. It will also be shown below that the effect of such legislation is regularly reviewed by the Monopolies Commission (MK).
