ABSTRACT
Mass terms are those such as ‘water’, ‘computer software’, and ‘knowledge’. They are contrasted with count terms such as ‘person’, ‘computer program’, and ‘belief’. Intuitively, mass terms refer to “stuff” while count terms refer to “objects.” Since mass terms refer to stuff, they (but not count terms) allow for measurement: ‘a liter of water’, ‘three CDs worth of computer software’, ‘many books worth of deep knowledge’. Since count terms refer to objects, they (but not mass terms) allow for counting, quantifying, and individuating: ‘a person’, ‘three computer programs’, ‘each belief of his’. Philosophers from many areas have found this distinction to be of interest-the metaphysical question of the primary existence of gunk vs. things is one obvious area, but also issues in the notions of identification and reidentification have been thought to be related to the distinction: Is it the same building when all the concrete has been replaced with new concrete? Been replaced with stone? A statue can cease to exist without its constituent matter ceasing to exist. Does this mean there are two entities here: the statue and the parcel of matter? Further afield, but still relevant, are questions about the referents of “abstract” mass terms, such as ‘Curiosity is an admirable quality to have’. The fact that ‘knowledge’ is a mass term while ‘beliefs’ is a count term have led some to question the account of knowledge as a justified true belief.
