ABSTRACT
In his biographical sketch, von Wright says “that Wittgenstein’s new philosophy is, so far as I can see, entirely outside any philosophical tradition and without literary sources of influence…. The author of the Philosophical Investigations has no ancestors in philosophy.” 1 I think that von Wright is substantially correct in this claim and most of what I shall say here is compatible with it. Setting aside questions of actual influence, I wish to ask another question: what philosophical movement does Wittgenstein’s later philosophy most resemble? My answer is Pyrrhonian scepticism. I know that many will find this suggestion outrageous, for it is generally thought that one of Wittgenstein’s contri-butions to philosophy was to have said something important against scepticism. Indeed, anti-scepticism seems to be a persistent theme from his earliest to his latest writings. Thus in the Tractatus he makes the following claim against scepticism:
6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it raises doubts where no question can be asked.
