ABSTRACT
At 6.1 Wittgenstein declares that the propositions of logic are tautologies and therefore “say nothing” (6.11). Wittgenstein’s truth-functional analysis of propositions is intended both to explain and justify this key doctrine. The question next arises why anyone should be interested in the propositions of logic if, as Wittgenstein maintains, they are empty of sense. Wittgenstein’s extraordinary answer is that we are interested in such tautologies precisely because they say nothing. That symbols can be combined in such a way that their representational capacity cancels out reveals something important about the character of these symbols. But an insight into the basic operation of our symbolism must at once give us an insight into the fundamental structure of the world. Our language, Wittgenstein seems to reason, finds application to the world and therefore must share a common structure with it.
6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal—logical—properties of language and the world.
The fact that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents.
