ABSTRACT
The current debate on Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) tends to focus on socio-political determinants of the crises that have recurred since Turkey’s membership application in 1987. This is understandable, because there is indeed a significant degree of divergence between EU and Turkish socio-political structures and orientations. One needs only to recall that Turkey has to undertake short-to medium-term reforms in no fewer than 32 policy areas in order to satisfy the political range of the Copenhagen criteria. These reform requirements were specified in the EU’s Accession Partnership document and Turkey had to spell them out somewhat reluctantly in its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). Because most of these reforms constitute highly sensitive issues for Turkey, it is natural that they have acquired a certain degree of prominence in public as well as academic debates. Yet there are equally significant indicators of economic policy divergence between Turkey and the EU. In fact, there are 85 short-to medium-term economic reform areas specified in the Accession Partnership as opposed to 32 areas for political reform (EU Council, 2001). Economic policy divergence, however, is either ignored or mentioned only in passing as an issue of secondary importance. This tendency has been evident at all major turning points in Turkey-EU relations – including the customs union decision of 1995. Part of the reason for this anomaly is the assumption that Turkey is well placed to satisfy the Copenhagen economic criteria, given the post-1980 liberalisation efforts. The other reason is the assumption that economic policy divergence between Turkey and the EU is bound to disappear (or diminish) as Turkey implements the structural reforms required by international financial institutions – especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
