ABSTRACT
In contrast to usual practice, we begin this concluding chapter with a digression. Instead of going into the book’s main findings on the current state of Turkey-EU relations, we will step back to the late 1980s and early 1990s – when the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted speculations on whether Turkey’s geo-strategic importance would decline. In response, Turkish policy-makers initiated a campaign asserting the significance of the ‘Turkish model’ in a post-Soviet world. The argument was simple and, therefore, appealing: Turkey, with the exception of Israel, was the only country in the region that combined parliamentary democracy with a market economy that was able to deliver satisfactory growth rates. Referring to the country’s Islamic heritage and its ethnic affinities with many of the post-Soviet countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it was argued that Turkey is well placed to act not only as a ‘model’ for many countries at the periphery of Europe but also as a bridge between the East and the West. Such arguments were in clear abundance – not only in statements envisaged for domestic consumption, but also in those aimed at strengthening Turkey’s case in negotiations with Western interlocutors, especially the European Union (EU).
