ABSTRACT
The previous chapters have examined, explored and analyzed the historical trajectories of the tri-dimensional Japanese reproductive system since the beginning of Japanese modernization in the late nineteenth century. The onset of modernization led the Meiji government to the realization of the necessity for fostering good human resources in order to survive the intensifying imperialist competition. A multitude of policies that encouraged Japanese people, in particular women, to organize their reproduction in an effective way that suited the national project of ‘enrich the country, strengthen the military’ was introduced ‘from above’. The state’s attempts to intervene in reproductive activities were enhanced during the total war and Occupation period. Population policies and social policies were innovated, and more women than ever became influenced by state regulation of everyday life, as the scope of policy was extended to engage in ‘total war’. Postwar democratization required the national government to cease such an authoritarian way of governing. Yet, political concerns over the biological, economic and socio-political reproduction of the population remained crucial in order that Japan advance along the path towards becoming a
global economic superpower. The Japanese government was actively involved in policies designed to control both the quantity and quality of the population, first in order to control the Malthusian-type crisis after the war, and then in order to reconstruct the Japanese nation-state and to catch up with the advanced industrialized countries of the West. The ‘creation of “good” human-beings’ was considered an integral part of the state’s catchup strategy in striving to achieve ‘income-doubling’. The postwar reproductive policies, however, relied heavily on a gendered assumption of the form the family should take, namely, the ‘postwar family system’. However, from the mid-1970s, the ‘postwar family system’ showed signs of destabilization, as represented by the phenomena of the delayed marriage and falling birthrates, and received a series of serious challenges. Also, direct interventions by the state into everyday life, in particular, ones relating to eugenics, seem to have lost legitimacy during this time. On the surface, the situation since the mid-1970s appeared to be characterized by the dysfunction of the once solid and stable reproductive system. Yet, as delayed marriage was caused by a rational calculation of maximizing benefits and happiness through setting up families among young Japanese people, the self-regulation of reproductive activities that aimed at maximizing happiness still remains at the core of the organization and management of everyday life, or more precisely, the tendency has been enhanced through being internalized as a norm for individuals.
