ABSTRACT
Major’s increasingly desperate efforts to maintain a semblance of party unity over Europe proved unavailing: Conservative infighting carried on undiminished into 1997. Even the approach of a general election, announced in midMarch and scheduled to take place on May 1, failed to end the internecine warfare, and throughout the unusually lengthy electoral campaign the Conservatives’ internal differences, especially on the issue of the single currency, were repeatedly exposed. So deep were the divisions, indeed, that a large number of candidates issued individual constituency manifestos setting out personal positions on the euro which were mutually contradictory and often at odds with official party policy. Not surprisingly, the outcome was a crushing defeat at the hands of New Labour, as the Labour Party now called itself. It would be simplistic to attribute the Conservatives’ abysmal performance, involving a loss of 177 seats, solely to their public quarrels about Europe. Other factors were at work, including Major’s perceived lack of authority, competition for votes from the Referendum Party, the lasting damage inflicted by the disastrous events of ‘Black Wednesday’, the outgoing government’s reputation for ‘sleaze’1 and a widespread feeling that it was time for change after eighteen years of being governed by the same party. Even so, there can be little doubt that the Conservatives paid a high price at the polls for their disarray over Europe. In comparison with the Conservative Party, Labour displayed a united
front on the EU in the run-up to the election. Its leading figures assiduously projected a pro-European image, while those within the party who were of a more eurosceptic disposition refrained from attempting to embarrass them. It was a thoroughly disciplined performance which threw into relief, as it was fully intended to, the turmoil in their opponents’ ranks. The contrast with the bitter feuding of the late-1970s and early-1980s could
scarcely have been greater. In the intervening period Labour’s stance towards the EU had undergone a process of radical change (as part of a comprehensive policy review) under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and John Smith,2
and by the time Tony Blair succeeded the latter in July 1994 the party was committed to establishing a harmonious working relationship with Britain’s European partners. This general evolution of Labour thinking had been
paralleled by a shift in Blair’s own views. At the time of his first election to parliament in 1983 Blair had strongly supported the party’s current policy of withdrawal from the EC, writing in his address to the voters of Sedgefield that British membership had ‘drained our natural resources and destroyed jobs’.3
According to Stephen Wall, his senior adviser on the EU between 2000 and 2004, Blair did not really agree with the official line.4 Others, however, take a different view, with one first-hand observer commenting that ‘there is no evidence that he [Blair] was ill at ease with the stance taken by the Labour Party led by Michael Foot’.5 Whatever the truth of the matter, what is certain is that in the course of the next few years Blair’s public attitude towards Europe had become increasingly favourable and from the mid-1990s, as Leader of the Opposition, he launched regular attacks on the government for what he saw as its negative approach to the EU. If he were in power, Blair insisted, Britain would never be isolated and marginalized as it had been in the Thatcher and Major years. Throughout the 1997 election campaign the Labour leadership was anxious
to enhance its pro-European credentials. It nevertheless took a cautious line, not least because of concerns about how the eurosceptic press might react. Thus the party manifesto contained little on the subject of Britain’s relations with the EU to distinguish it from that of the Conservatives. The only real difference of substance was on the issue of the Social Chapter, with Labour pledging to end the opt-out negotiated at Maastricht and the Conservatives giving a commitment to maintain it. Both manifestos expressed opposition to a federal Europe and a strong preference for the EU as a partnership of nations. In both of them, moreover, it was urged that British policy should be focused on such items as enlargement, reform of the CAP and completion of the single market. On the question of EMU, there was equally a marked similarity between the two party positions. While keeping open the possibility of joining the single currency, the Conservatives stressed the importance of the opt-out and a referendum. Labour, for its part, spoke of ‘formidable obstacles’ to Britain joining as part of the first wave in 1999, adding that entry would only ever take place if it had been approved by the Cabinet and Parliament and in a referendum. As the election campaign progressed, Labour caution increased in response
to evidence from opinion polls suggesting a growth of eurosceptic sentiment among voters.6 Blair reacted to Conservative taunts that his determination not to be isolated in the EU would lead him to play a subservient role by writing jingoistic articles in the Sun in which he proclaimed, amongst other things, his ‘love for the pound’ and his determination to slay the ‘dragon’ of a European superstate.7 He set out his position in more measured fashion in a speech which he made in Manchester on April 21. In this speech, Blair struck a carefully calculated balance between his desire to establish better relations with Britain’s EU partners and his determination to defend vital national interests, even if that meant having to stand alone. A Labour government, he said, would be prepared to consider a limited extension of QMV, but would
insist on retaining a right of veto where it was felt to be necessary. As regards EMU, which he described as the ‘hardest question’, Blair ruled out any ‘fudge’ over British entry to the single currency: that would only take place, he asserted, if there was a genuine and sustainable convergence between the UK’s economic cycle and those of the other countries concerned. One of the most interesting aspects of the whole speech was Blair’s admission that in many areas, including EMU, the ‘formal’ positions adopted by the Conservatives and Labour were virtually the same. Where there was a difference, he argued, was in his party’s ability to deliver what was promised:
