ABSTRACT
The process of British adjustment to being a member of the EC in the decade after entry proved to be a long, complicated and troublesome one. In other member states the UK quickly acquired a reputation for being awkward and uncooperative, while in Britain itself substantial sections of opinion remained either opposed to membership or at best doubtful as to whether the benefits which it brought outweighed the costs. It was the persistence of such widespread hostility and scepticism that led to a continuing and highly divisive debate on the issue and to the holding of a referendum in the summer of 1975. The suggestion has been made by one inside observer that the early strains
which arose between the UK and its European partners were caused to some extent at least by a tendency on the part of British policymakers to adopt an aloof and superior attitude.1 This was allegedly accompanied by a failure to adapt to the country’s new role within the EC (Denman 1996). According to this interpretation, successive political leaders remained locked in a mind-set which accorded priority to links with the Commonwealth and the United States rather than Europe. Heath, with his deep conviction that Britain’s future was bound up above all with that of the other major European states, was a solitary exception to this trend. He was, in any case, soon to be out of office, brought down in February 1974 by a combination of domestic and international crises. His successors – Wilson (1974-76), Callaghan (1976-79), Thatcher (1979-90) and Major (1990-97) – ‘chose to pursue a policy of quarrelsome obstructionism’ in their dealings with EC colleagues and thereby squandered valuable opportunities to consolidate Britain’s position as a leading player (Denman 1996: 243). What they lacked was a real understanding of the drive to unity engendered on the other side of the Channel by the experience of defeat and occupation during the Second World War. They ‘knew nothing of Europe’s history or its culture … Towards the Continent their incomprehension led to indifference and at times a chauvinist hostility’ (Denman 1996: 277). While there is considerable substance in this analysis, to accept it in its
entirety, including the degree of deliberate intention which it implies, would be to underestimate the extent to which all British leaders during this period
were trammelled in their conduct of European policy by serious internal and external constraints that were largely beyond their control. Even so, it seems clear that the undoubted continuation of pre-entry habits of thought within the UK’s political elite added to the difficulties of adjustment.2 Nor was such thinking confined to policymaking circles. Rather, it reflected the general public mood. Heath’s stated hope was that membership of the EC would bring an end to the distinction that many of his countrymen routinely drew between ‘them’ and ‘us’ when discussing Europe. This did not happen, however, and long after entry had been achieved, it was (as it still is) commonplace for the term ‘Europe’ to be used as if it applied to a separate and distinct entity to which Britain did not fully belong. At the root of the protracted struggle to come to terms with life in the EC,
then, was a problem of cultural and psychological adjustment. This was compounded by the need to resolve many practical and political difficulties in the immediate aftermath of entry. An example of these was the sharp disagreement that soon arose between Britain and its partners over energy policy. The quadrupling of international oil prices during 1973-74 raised the question of whether the EC should adopt a common energy strategy. There was a limit to how far Heath was prepared to go along those lines. While he was strongly in favour of forming a united front for dealing with the oil producing countries, he refused to accept a proposal from the French and Germans that all EC energy resources should be pooled in times of crisis. His attitude was strongly influenced by the fact that North Sea oil was about to come into production. This was also a prime consideration for Heath’s successor. Wilson was adamant that the UK’s reserves should be kept outside the scope of EC legislation. He also demanded (unsuccessfully) that Britain’s new status as an oil-producing country should be recognized by the granting of separate representation at the international conference on energy that was held in Paris in December 1975.3
Another significant question that had to be addressed shortly after the UK’s accession to the EC was that of fishing rights, an area in which substantial British interests were at stake. The starting point for what developed into the CFP was an agreement reached in 1970 which granted free access to EC waters for the fishermen of all member states. When Britain subsequently joined the EC, it was allowed to retain its existing national 12-mile limit until 1982. Concerns were raised in 1976, however, when the EC adopted an exclusive fishing zone of 200 miles. It was now unclear how far British fishing interests would be protected after the special transition period came to an end, and the uncertainty created by this state of affairs provided critics of EC membership, including Enoch Powell, with powerful ammunition for their attacks. As a result of the CFP, Powell complained, the fate of Britain’s fishing industry would henceforward be in the hands of ‘the landlubbers of Brussels’.4
