ABSTRACT
In a preface Wittgenstein (1975) said that if one were to write anything of general significance it would be against the spirit of the age. Rorty, conforming to such a spirit, has said that, effectively, all transcendental religious claims are myths that should be treated in a reductionist manner. So he insists that such beliefs should shrink to becoming a subset of the philosophy of mind. Whether or not the resurrection is true and (or) is logical, Rorty’s policy exceeds our knowledge of the universe. Therefore, whether or not Rorty’s or Hume’s views are true or false, their unprovable status commits the user to holding a sort of anachronistic totalitarian mythology of reductionism. Oddly, this is exactly the type of imperious dogmatism that Hume was attempting to controvert. Hume’s belief was that in relevant respects, we could not supervene over history with generalised truths; yet Rorty does. But the Hume/Rorty claim that there is no relevant general truth of history entails its contradictory. Since they assert that history has this non-general property, it follows that history has a general property. Therefore their views are false.
