ABSTRACT
Some main traditions in modernist and poststructuralist culture, in particular philosophy and theology, have been parasitic on reductionism and empirical simplicity, not only of verificationism but also of some trends in applied sciences. Clear-headed consciousness is wonderful. In contrast, many notions of simplicity are contrary and complicated. Some scientists employ the term ‘simplicity’ to label their approaches, though as I noticed in chapter 2, Herbert Simon (2001: 35) plausibly explains that their activities should be labelled as parsimony since it ‘is the ratio of the complexity of the data set to the complexity of the formula’. In any case a non-scientist would be baffled to be told to read and understand almost any example of significant scientific simplicity in its research form. So simplicity often marks a sometimes-useful myth that is replete with unstable contingencies. Life is more complicated than this myth. And simplicity belays the depth of both problems and opportunities. Concern with depth and theoretical felicity has exposed fresh prospects for transcendence, which makes reductionism and physicalism seem inept and over-generalised. The applied world of ethical problems exemplifies a complexity and need for pragmatic idealism, including a focus on the applied significance of abstract analysis of value and values as well as, for example, the qualitative functions of moral decency.
