ABSTRACT
Four clear lessons emerge from the analysis of strategic raiding in West Africa. All of them rotate around the role of the force commander. The first is that, if one hopes for success, then the force commander must succeed in getting within the decision loops both of the enemy and any parts of his own higher command structure which might constrain his freedom of action. Given this devolution of both strategic and operational command into his hands, it becomes possible for him to shape strategies which follow the Clausewitzian sequence: tactically, in that he shapes engagements for the purposes of the battle; strategically, in that he shapes battles for the purposes of the war. In this way, the case studies showed successful commanders controlling the four domains of time, space, perception and knowledge in ways which increased their area for strategic manoeuvre: it was true of Wolseley; it was true of Richards; it was, in contrast, not the case for General Wesley Clark.
