ABSTRACT
One of the first acts of Bill Clinton on his re-election as US president in November 1996 was to promote Madeleine Karbol Albright, then American ambassador to the UN, to secretary of state. This was bad news for Iraq. At the UN she had pursued an uncompromisingly hawkish policy on Baghdad. Nothing captured her stony-hearted attitude towards Iraq better than the statement she made during her interview with Lesley Stahl on Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS) Television’s “60 Minutes” program on May 12, 1996. “More than 500,000 Iraqi children are already dead as a direct result of the UN sanctions,” said Stahl. “Do you think the price is worth paying?” Albright replied, “It is a difficult question. But, yes, we think the price is worth it.” 1
So it came as no surprise when on March 26, 1997, Albright said, “We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.” UN sanctions, she insisted, would remain.2 This was a reprise of what President Bush’s Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates, had said in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War: UN sanctions would remain so long as Saddam exercised power in Baghdad, and meanwhile, “Iraqis will pay the price.”3 So there was no incentive for Saddam to cooperate with Unscom. But unlike in spring 1991 his position was far from hopeless.
