ABSTRACT
The broader issues of security and asymmetric conflict in urban environments now frame the West’s assessment of urban operations. The objectives and methods used by US-led forces in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, for example, were shaped by the post-11 September 2001 debates; American priorities and resource allocation shifted as the ‘War on Terrorism’ became the defining feature of George W. Bush’s presidency. The psychological impact of the suicide hijackings of 11 September on the US administration resulted in an aggressive expeditionary stance that built on the notion of ‘transformation’, whereby developments such as unmanned vehicles and lighter agile land forces are used to dissuade the USA’s adversaries from fighting in cities. What is more, transformation’s advocates claim that the precision munitions, better surveillance and communications capabilities on which it is built will make urban war less costly for US forces. Traditional approaches to urban war (such as ‘rubbleisation’) are to be replaced by a new conceptual framework that emphasises the need for understanding the religious and ethnic populations of cities, shaping it by providing welfare for non-combatants, engaging adversaries with lethal and non-lethal means, consolidating control while restoring vital infrastructure, and transitioning out of an operation. New military doctrines are to be developed.
