ABSTRACT
The way forces make war hinges on their technological advantages. At the same time the way in which technology is used depends on how the nature of war is understood. It is significant, therefore, that there is a strong professional consensus that urban war retains more in common with fighting in the 1940s than most contemporary operations. So too is the fact that there is as yet no evidence that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) has caused a fundamental shift in the nature and conduct of urban operations; sophisticated technologies may have ensured that Baghdad was taken quickly, but they could not manage the consequent disorder, which required conventional street-craft and peacekeeping skills. Indeed, forces may even look to the past for tactical advantage. The capture by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) of the densely populated Palestinian refugee camps in Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm in early 2002, for example, was credited by the Jerusalem Post of 9 March 2002 to an IDF commander’s rediscovery of mouseholing. Paratroopers and Special Forces from the Israeli Home Front Command used electric-powered carbide discs, sledgehammers and small explosives to punch their way through the cinder block walls of the camps, so avoiding snipers and booby traps in the narrow alleyways. Yet the very consensus that success relies on experience and training rather than technology makes the search for technological solutions doubly attractive; technology
could represent the decisive advantage leading to military success.
