ABSTRACT
In the previous chapter, we saw how a number of metaphorical themes give
the contest between realism (or GME) and anti-realism (or SSK) its
dichotomous character: we are required to assign priority either to the
‘world’ and ‘the joints’ of the object (with GME and the realist), or the
‘world’ and ‘the joints’ of the subject (with SSK and the anti-realist). I
concluded that another epistemological metaphor or family of metaphors is
needed, one which can articulate the relation between subject and object in
a way which does not repeat the internal-external dichotomy. In this chapter, I argue that such a metaphor is introduced by Bachelard and Heidegger.
In different ways, they configure the encounter between subject and world
as an opening, which is to say that subject and world meet each other not as
two pre-formed components but as entities who acquire their being through
their mutual participation in or as an opening. This achieves a different
kind of belonging within epistemology. Conventionally, the foundations of
knowledge are ascribed either to the subject or to the object, hence the
oscillation between realism and anti-realism. In contrast, the image of the opening works epistemologically as a metaphor for knowledge but the
opposition conventionally expressed in terms of subjectivity and objectivity
is ascribed differently. Quite what this means, I explain below. I also draw
out the differences in Heidegger’s and Bachelard’s formulation of the metaphor,
and suggest what impact these differences have on their theories of knowledge.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the opposition between epistemological
subjectivism and objectivism is sustained by images which promote binary
distinction, for example the distinction between what is internal to or
belongs to something, and what is external to or does not belong to some-
thing. The parallel contest between correspondence and coherence brings a
related binary image, one which allows either a state of belonging to or
being in contact with reality, on the one hand, or a state of belonging to the
subject but being detached or removed from reality, on the other. In contrast, Heidegger and Bachelard present theories of knowledge based on the
image of an opening which does not perpetuate the binary, oppositional
notion of belonging.
