ABSTRACT
The most standardizing frameworks of uninational federations do not seem the most suitable principles for a political accommodation of multinational realities, especially when the number of federated units is high in relation to the number of national collectivities living in the same federation. Culturally speaking, the ‘tyranny of the majority’ has also shown its perverse effects in its lack of recognition of the internal national pluralism of some polities. The intergroup regulations of a multinational state require constitutional guarantees of negative liberal liberty at the collective level or, in Kymlicka’s terms, the regulation of a number of institutional external protectionsconstitutional rights, veto powers in upper chambers, composition and powers of Supreme or Constitutional Courts, a clear and decentralized division of powers, etc.—that accompany the lack of internal restrictions in intra-group relations. The collective rights and values of national minorities must be recognized at the same level as the collective rights and values of the majorities, which have usually been recognized in traditional constitutionalism.1
