ABSTRACT

What is the outcome of the Tractatus with respect to the hubris, which opened our discussion of modernism? Wittgenstein’s effort to capture the essence of modernity as precisely and neatly as possible culminates in the way it pinpoints metaphysical language, the language of philosophy, as the ultimate source of this hubris. The language of the Tractatus is of course itself such a vain language, showing acutely – and ironically – the connection between the two meanings embedded in the term, ‘vanity’. The vain language of philosophy is both empty (nonsensical) and arrogant. Vain language is stripped from its royal apparel and exposed as an imposture. It is a ghostlanguage, a parasite upon ordinary language, but devoid of any genuine meaning. Wittgenstein’s modernist pessimism leaves us with a modest language. Not only God, ethics, aesthetics, the metaphysical subject and similar concepts – when reflected upon philosophically – are cast out of this language, but also the power of reflection itself. In the absence of an Outside, in which our language could be reflected, whatever is left of these notions must only present itself – it can never be said, i.e. represented.