ABSTRACT

Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Atsuhiro Taki emphasise several institutional features in Japan which differ from those in Euro-American countries: for example, the permanent employment and seniority system in wages and promotion, the dual structure, Keiretsu transactions, the main bank system, and intercorporate shareholding. This book examines in particular the distinction between long-run and short-run contractual relationships which produced such features. It presents both the positive and the negative evaluations of the factor market. Exploring the similarities and interdependencies between two important and idiosyncratic factor markets in Japan, this book brings data to hand which until now has only been available in specialist journals.

chapter |9 pages

Introduction

chapter |18 pages

Dispatched directors

An aspect of the Japanese main bank system

chapter |17 pages

Capital adequacy constraint for banks and the real economy

A general equilibrium evaluation under intercorporate shareholding

chapter |16 pages

Concluding remarks