ABSTRACT
Collingwood’s Autobiography (1939) (A), described by George Santayana as ‘‘strangely conceited but instructive’’ (Boucher 1995: 6)1 has been the subject of considerable controversy: as much for its openly contemptuous attack on his philosophical opponents as for its role in providing a key to the interpretation of his thought. In From Realism to Rapprochement: The Autobiographical Interpretation of Collingwood’s Philosophy, Glen Shipley complains that virtually none of Collingwood’s commentators have considered the A as an interpretation valid for the whole of his philosophy2 – most still do not even today.3 According to Shipley, the question we should be asking about Collingwood’s philosophical development is not, what chronological series of publications occurred during his lifetime, but rather, what order or sequence of thoughts he intended his readers to follow if they are to understand his thinking. For this purpose, Shipley argues, one must turn to the A, for it is there that ‘‘Collingwood publicly specified for his philosophical heirs what sort of program he wished them to inherit, and in it he tried to make clear how they should proceed to lay claim to this inheritance’’ (Shipley 1984: vol. 1, 44).
