ABSTRACT
In recent years, analytical psychology has had some notable success in becoming integrated within the academy (see, for example, Kirsch, 2000:55-56, 121-23). One major factor contributing to this is the appearance of an increasingly rigorous level of scholarly work on Jung by sympathetic academics (e.g., Ellenberger, 1970; Homans, 1979; Shamdasani, 1995; Bishop, 1995, 2000). Another is the increasing willingness and ability of some post-Jungian thinkers to engage with prevalent academic discourses on their own terms-for instance, in philosophy (e.g., Papadopoulos and Saayaman, 1991; R.Brooke, Adler, Gerhard 318 1993, 2001), literature (e.g., Rowland, 1999), or social and cultural theory (e.g., Adams, 1996; Hauke, 2000). However, even in the midst of this success, one can frequently notice considerable caginess, not to say embarrassment, when academics encounter the religious component within analytical psychology. Often, this religious component is alone sufficient grounds for academics to disregard Jungian contributions to their fields. Such embarrassment, though possibly less frequent and acute, is not absent even within religious studies, where Jungian theory provides more often the object than the method of study and where more rationalistic theoretical or methodological frameworks usually keep the religious attitude within Jungian thought safely pinioned. It is true that many commendable studies of the relationship between analytical psychology and religion have continued to appear-some with a more academic, others with a more clinical emphasis (see, for example, Heisig, 1979; Stein, 1985; Ryce-Menuhin, 1994; Lammers, 1994; Corbett, 1996; Palmer, 1997). However, this on its own does not seem to affect the overall academic disquiet about the religiosity embedded in Jungian theory.
