ABSTRACT
By the end of the 1960s, apart from the few major oil-producing countries whose economies were then totally or largely dependent on the continuing production and export of crude oil, Japan appeared to stand as the country most susceptible to economic upheaval in the event of a major upset in the international oil industry. Japan’s clear understanding, at the time of the oil-crisis in 1973–4, that that, indeed, was the position was demonstrated by the speed with which it adjusted its policies towards Israel and the Arab States. The more favourable and supportive attitude it established in the immediate aftermath of the crisis towards the latter reflected Japan’s need to ensure that it was not placed on the Arab oil exporters’ embargo list. Japan’s status vis-à-vis the international oil industry at that time and the problems associated with that status resembled in kind those of Western Europe (see Chapter 5), but in degree they were significantly accentuated by the interplay of a set of factors specific to Japan. These will be examined in this chapter.
