ABSTRACT
When we switch our attention from the nature of law to the reach of the law, the first question is whether we have good reason to accept that the law has any proper authority at all. Why should we obey it? To a certain extent, the answer is implicit in the analysis of the ‘nature of law’ question. If law is held to be morally authoritative by definition, it will seem that an obligation to obey flows simply from the recognition of law as law. If the definition of law excludes this moral authority, the source of obligation must be sought elsewhere. The question about authority, however, is not as straightforward as this. What we are asking about is the kind of connection to be found between the authority of rulers to lay down laws and the legal and moral duty of the ruled to obey them. It is often asserted that there is a prima facie general duty of obligation to obey the law. What this means is that in the absence of special reasons that might justify a specific exemption, the acknowledgement of the law’s authority leads to the acceptance of the duty of obedience. How it might lead to this, however, is a matter for debate. It may be for reasons quite independent of the authoritative status of the law. The special reasons for suspending this presumption, furthermore, suggesting that there are limits to the general duty, must arise from considerations powerful enough to override the standard reasons for compliance.
