ABSTRACT
The debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal has proved highly divisive for the political establishments and concerned elites in the two countries. Opinion was sharply polarised between those in the United States who believed that the deal will fi rmly enmesh India within the non-proliferation regime, and those who are convinced that it seriously erodes that regime. Similarly, the Indian debate revolved around whether the Indo-US nuclear deal, while eroding its pariah status in the international nuclear regime, would inhibit its strategic program and restrict its freedom of political action, becoming subservient to the United States. These divergent approaches sharply divided academia, the media, political parties and public opinion in the two countries on the nuclear deal. Its divisive nature was epitomised by the UPA Government’s unwillingness to notice the 10th anniversary of India’s Pokharan tests in May 1998, lest it stir controversy and offend the United States. Unfortunately, the subsequent debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal became a dialogue of the deaf — all black and white — with no middle ground left for either mediation or compromise. This reality informing the technical and political dimensions of the nuclear deal needs greater appreciation.
