ABSTRACT
Moral trade-offs seem an inevitable part of the morally conscientious person’s life. The only theorists who deny this are global absolutists who view duties as absolute, and who are disinclined to accept that there are moral conflicts in which a kind of moral remainder—a sense of wrongness—is left over even when the conflict has been rationally resolved. For most of us, there is a sense that we can build moral credit, lose it, and go into a kind of moral debt, at least with respect to some of our morally significant actions. Helping Oxfam by donating large parts of my salary might mean forgoing a benefit for my family. Helping one child might mean sacrificing some well-being for another child. One function of effective moral deliberation is to negotiate these sorts of decisions responsibly. Utilitarians have often been characterized as advocating a very simple way of making such decisions—a form of moral cost/benefit analysis. Critics note that this method of decision making seems inappropriate with respect to some moral decisions, at least—particularly those having to do with the lives and well-being of other persons. But the issue is much more general, too. Most view at least some trade-offs as inevitable, and they seem willing to extend credit for some actions—for example, those that seem to require a sacrifice on the part of the agent. This chapter explores this issue in the context of environmental ethics, focusing on the example of carbon offsets. Carbon offsets have been controversial for a variety of reasons. The reason relevant to this discussion has to do with the view that there is something wrong with a moral credit and debit system with respect to certain harms to the environment. This chapter attempts to diagnose the worry and offer a solution that supports the permissibility of carbon offsets.
