The right to speak
The problem of suicide is the problem of philosophy, insofar as suicide remains a hypothesis. To live is the only solution to the problem, but it cannot be a solution, unless suicide is a hypothetical problem. It makes no sense to argue that life remains the solution to the problem of suicide when that problem is no longer hypothetical, which is when the problem of suicide is not the problem of philosophy. Life is not a hypothesis, such that, for the one who goes on living, suicide remains in hypothesis, which is how it is a purely philosophical problem. Life is not a hypothesis, and the one who commits suicide does nothing to solve the problem of philosophy, which is only hypothetical, because, for the one who commits suicide, life is the problem, life which is not a hypothesis, a hypothetical problem, a philosophical problem, but life which is the opposite of death. Death is the solution to the life that is a problem for not being a hypothesis. If the problem of suicide is a philosophical problem, that is, if one, by nature, desires to know whether or not life is worth living, then Camus is right, and that problem is not one among many, but the fundamental problem of philosophy (see Camus 1991:3).