ABSTRACT
In the fi rst part of this book we have explored how philosophical refl ection is shaped at several levels by philosophical pictures. More specifi cally, we have explored how such refl ection is shaped by autonomous cognitive processes and effects that complement each other and make up what we called the ‘pictorial process’: We have seen that processes and effects of which we are hardly ever aware and which are not under our direct control may decisively shape the concepts philosophers use, the intuitions we feel compelled to honour, the swift arguments that take us from trite premises to earth-shaking conclusions (with-remarkably-few compelling steps) and the claims we confi dently maintain as well as the problems thus raised and the theories proposed to solve these problems. In the second part of the book (chapters 4-6), we turned from intuitive reasoning to the deliberate and careful construction of philosophical arguments, and found that such arguments too may be shaped-and vitiated-by unsound non-intentional reasoning. We discovered that infl uential philosophical doctrines which are ‘supported’ by a familiar stock of carefully constructed arguments and which raise central philosophical problems have been maintained as a matter of delusion. Indeed, we found that the autonomous thought processes we have analysed systematically engender such philosophical delusions, whose clash with reality or among each other systematically gives rise to philosophical problems. We have thus established the need for therapy in philosophy, to liberate us from philosophical delusions and the bogus problems they have us imagine.
