ABSTRACT
As Britain’s economic stake in the Gulf increased from the early 1950s, the laissez-faire approach which had characterized British policy before the war gave way to greater pro-activity. This manifested itself in attempts at greater intervention in the internal affairs of the states of the Lower Gulf. At the end of the decade, the problems entailed in this policy shift were highlighted by the Political Resident, Sir George Middleton. ‘Our difficulties’, he averred, ‘derive from our having special responsibilities without enjoying the exercise of executive powers. We can persuade, advise or cajole, but we cannot command.’1 Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez war, the British position in the Gulf was seriously challenged for the first time not only by progressive forces in the region, but also by growing scepticism among British policy-makers themselves about the long-term viability of Britain’s special position there. Indeed, from the end of 1956 an ongoing debate started which culminated in the 1967 decision that Britain should aim to leave the Gulf by the mid-1970s. This decision was all the more momentous in the context of the post-war expansion of Britain’s interests in the region, especially following Iran’s nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 (see Chapter 5).2
