ABSTRACT
We have argued that drawing a simple dichotomy between Putin’s neoSoviet and post-Soviet faces is inadequate, although not untrue. These two faces undoubtedly existed in uncomfortable tension, but the fundamental dynamic of Putin’s leadership, and what prevented either one or the other face enjoying predominance, was the development of a ‘third path’ that began to transcend the sterile divisions of the past. However, it would be a hard job convincing the people that the promised land of democratic capitalist modernity was attainable and actually an improvement over the years of Soviet captivity; and like the Israelites of old, Russians cast many a wistful glance back to comforts and security of Egyptian (read Soviet) enslavement. As Glinski puts it, ‘For the overwhelming majority of Russians . . . the costs of transition to normalcy still clearly outweigh the benefits. . . .2 There is clearly something of the prophet about Putin’s dogged insistence that Russia’s future lies with Europe, the West and democratic capitalist modernity, while insisting at the same time that this did not mean that Russia had to repress its own identity or give up the pursuit of its national interests. Let us try below to sum up some of the themes explored in this book and to explore how we can move beyond a straightforward dichotomous view of Putin’s presidency.
