ABSTRACT
Wittgenstein did more than contribute to the philosophy of science: his early work was one of the influences – and an important one – that made its foundation possible. He also did less than contribute, not only by ignoring the special philosophical problems of science in his later thinking, but also by the implicit and explicit denial of a central or paradigmatic role for science in our thought and life. Those who sought enlightenment from it, or who looked on it as the instrument or motor of progress, incurred his bitterest polemics. Now, fifty, sixty, or seventy years on, science has proved even more influential than could have been foreseen. To learn today from Wittgenstein’s attitudes, we need to alter them – to mollify or to intensify or more probably to refocus them. I shall limit myself to the humbler task of reminding you what Wittgenstein conceived science to be, and of suggesting how this conception affected his valuation of it.
