ABSTRACT
The Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. The intervention, intended as a highly visible display of military strength and enduring might, merely emphasised the fundamental structural and behavioural weaknesses of many Russian institutions in the post-Soviet era, notably the presidency, government, parliament and armed forces. Renewed fighting in Chechnya, which began at the end of 1999, has re-focused attention on Russia’s relationship with its constituent parts, particularly in the volatile North Caucasus. It also serves to emphasise the importance of the region to Russia, which is expending vast quantities of resources, both material and human, in a second attempt to subdue the rebellious republic. The protracted crisis has proved to be a significant juncture in the development of the fledgling Russian democracy and illustrates the highly personalised nature of decision-making in the postcommunist era.
