ABSTRACT
Dudayev’s inaugural presidential decree brought about the secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia, heightening fears of a potential disintegration of the Federation, regardless of the fact that it was the sole constituent part to institute such a tenacious measure. In the wake of the 1991 Chechen declaration of independence, the central authorities failed to re-assert their supremacy, and three years ensued before the Russian leadership took the decision to exert full-scale military pressure on the rebellious republic, ample time for the small territory to arm itself against the perceived ‘imperial’ threat. Article 70 of the RSFSR Constitution, adopted by the Soviet leadership in 1977, stated that ‘the territory of the RSFSR may not be changed without the agreement of the RSFSR itself ’,1 a statute that was clearly breached by the unilateral Chechen declaration of independence.
