ABSTRACT
Most theories and models of causal attribution and inference in psychology essentially concern a process or method of causal attribution. The classical causal attribution model, Kelley’s (1967) multiple observation model, for instance, proposes a set procedure based on the application of the covariation principle to information organised along certain dimensions. All such models fail, however, for the simple reason that no one process is basic to causal processing.1 Something is basic to causal processing if it is involved in all and only causal processing. Whatever is basic is the thing that makes a process a causal attribution or inference process, and not a process of any other kind. Since the evidence shows that there are many different kinds of process in causal processing-compare Michotte (1963) with Siegler and Liebert (1974), for example-no process qualifies as basic to causal processing. To be adequate as a theory, an account must begin by identifying what is basic to causal processing and build up from there. I argue that what is basic to causal processing is not a process but a concept of the causal relation, and I build up a theoretical account from that. I first describe the basic features of the theory and its conceptual foundation. I then outline a typology of causal questions and show how the methods or processes used to make a causal attribution depend on the type of question that has been asked.
