ABSTRACT
Even if the arguments traced in the two preceding chapters had been more successful, we would be left with a sizeable problem. When we started from within, we managed to obtain either labelled states of mind or symbols and were able to reach the conclusion that the symbols amount to a picture of the world which represents our states of mind. This conclusion is the inverse of the old situation in which the states of mind were somehow allowed to represent the world. Labels, however, even at their best, we found to be only hypothetical. Symbols, we found, though more immediate in their meaning and less hypothetical than labels, did not stand any more than labels in an unequivocal relationship to the states of mind they mean. Either a symbol means too many different states of mind because it is lacking in precision; or a whole series of different but more precise symbols mean one specific state of mind. In symbolisation there is either lack of precision in the relatum or uncertainty in the choice of a referent. Either way, we had to conclude that states of mind can neither be labelled nor symbolised with certainty.
