Following the discussions of the last investigation, we grasp the ideal unity of a meaning in the light of the act-character of signiﬁcation; this signiﬁcation’s peculiar ‘tincture’ distinguishes the meaning-consciousness of a given expression from that of one which differs in meaning. This does not of course mean that this act-character is the concrete reality upon whose basis the meaning as Species is constituted for us. The relevant concrete reality is rather the total experience of the understood expression, which is informed by this act-character as its animating ‘tincture’. The relation between the meaning and the signiﬁcant expression (or its ‘meaning-tincture’) is the same as the relation, e.g., between the Species Red and a red object of intuitive experience (or the ‘moment’ of red which appears in this object). When we mean Red in specie, a red object appears before us, and in this sense we look towards the red object to which we are nevertheless not referring. The moment of red is at the same time emphasized in this object, and to that extent we can again say that we are looking towards this moment of red. But we are not referring to this individually deﬁnite trait in the object, as we are referring to it when, e.g., we make the phenomenological observation that the red moments in the separate portions of the apparent object’s surface are themselves separate. While the red object and its emphasized red moment appear before us, we are rather ‘meaning’ the single identical Red, and are meaning it in a novel conscious manner, though which precisely the Species, and not the individual, becomes our object. The same would apply also to a meaning in its relation to an expression, and an expression’s meaningful orientation, whether this expression relates to a corresponding intuition or not.