ABSTRACT
Now these examples show that different kinds of symbols stand for what they represent in virtue of different kinds of fact. But they also show that not everything that is thought of as a symbol stands for what it represents in the same sense. Furthermore, when an object is understood as a symbol, or when it functions as a symbol, the object may have no interest or importance in itself on that occasion but only as a symbol-so that it would be possible to replace, without significant loss, one symbol by another symbol which stands for the same thing; or those features of the symbol without which it would not symbolise what in fact it does may be interesting in their own right; or those features of the symbol which are not responsible for its semantic function may also make a significant contribution to the symbol’s effectiveness as a symbol or to its overall effect. Hence, it is essential that the nature of the supposed symbolic function of music should be clarified before we can assess the
thesis that it is integral to the value of some or all musical works that they are, in the intended sense, symbols. The most notable attempt to effect such a clarification is the theory of music elaborated by Susanne Langer in Philosophy in a New Key.1
